

Open Session

Session Title: History of Western Philosophy

Name	Title and Abstract
Harry Alanen	<p>Kinēsis vs Energeia: A Defence of MetaphysicsΘ.6 1048b18-35</p> <p>Aristotle characterizes an interesting difference between two types of actions (praxeis) in <i>MetaphysicsΘ 6 1048b18-35</i> (“the Passage”) in terms of their relation to their goal (telos): activities proper (energeiai) are or contain their goals; changes (kinēseis) do not. Recent scholarship has questioned the philosophical relevance the sc. “Passage” has for its immediate context, the whole of Book Θ, and for Aristotle’s natural philosophy in general. This talk defends the Passage on philosophical grounds by showing that the main reasons for rejecting it are weak. While there may textual reasons for rejecting the Passage, the aim of this talk is to contribute to the philosophical debate on the topics of the Passage and its relevance for Aristotle’s philosophy more broadly. Understanding the difference between goal-containing and goal-exclusive actions is not only important for understanding Aristotle’s metaphysics and natural philosophy, but also for his arguments in <i>MetaphysicsΘ</i>—or so I will argue.</p>
Joshua D. Hooke	<p>The Greek Sources of Martin Heidegger’s <i>Dunamis</i>: The Twofold Force of Being</p> <p>In the summer of 1931, Heidegger delivered a lecture course at the University of Freiburg on Aristotle’s <i>MetaphysicsΘ 1–3</i>, which was later published in 1981 as volume 33 of <i>Heidegger’s Collected Works</i>. It cannot be understated that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s <i>Metaphysics</i>, as captured in this lecture course, provides necessary insight into Heidegger’s question concerning Being. Heidegger provides a thorough treatment of potentiality and actuality (as they are generally conceived) in <i>Being and Time</i>; however, his sources are notoriously concealed, leaving the reader curious about the family resemblance to Aristotle’s conception of potentiality (<i>dunamis</i>). This essay should serve as elucidatory by examining Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s potentiality (<i>dunamis</i>) from his lecture course: <i>MetaphysicsΘ 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force</i>. By doing so, preliminary steps are taken for a larger project that addresses whether Heidegger provides a novel interpretation of Aristotle which is grounded in <i>Metaphysics</i>, or whether what Heidegger finds in <i>Metaphysics</i> are in large part grafts from his own thought. In essence, the question I will explore is whether Heidegger is simply making Aristotle a good Heideggerian while misappropriating Aristotle’s thought, or whether Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle aids in an authentic understanding of potentiality (<i>dunamis</i>).</p>
Michael T. Michael	<p>“Socratic Intellectualism” Reconsidered: An Anti-Intellectualist Interpretation of the Denial of Akrasia</p> <p>Socrates has long faced the criticism of being intellectualist – of focusing excessively on the intellectual side of human conduct without adequately considering the emotional side. In this paper, I offer a different perspective on this issue. Focusing on the <i>Protagoras</i>, and drawing on contemporary philosophical work on the emotions, I propose an interpretation of Socratic knowledge that conceives of knowledge and emotion as intimately connected. Through this, a sense of intellectualism emerges in which it is not Socrates who is guilty of intellectualism, but us. Indeed, under this sense, Socrates is anti-intellectualist.</p>
Jim Chamberlain	<p>Hume on ‘Delicate Sympathy’</p> <p>Hume’s <i>Treatise</i> account of the ‘principle of sympathy’ entails that we sympathise with ideas of passions only when they are livelier than beliefs. This contradicts Hume’s account of ‘delicate sympathy’, by which we sympathise with ideas of passions that are less lively than beliefs. The principle of sympathy appears to be absent from Hume’s moral <i>Enquiry</i>. I argue that Hume merely rejects those aspects of the principle which are incompatible with delicate sympathy. This interpretation sheds new light on a longstanding puzzle about Hume’s theory of sympathy, and indicates the importance of delicate sympathy to his theory of moral judgement.</p>

Session Title: Philosophy of Logic

Name	Title and Abstract
Andrea Lupo	<p>Is Plural Logic Indispensable?</p> <p>The aim of this paper is to evaluate the main strategy pursued by philosophical logicians in their attempt to justify the need for extending First-Order Logic into Plural Logic. I start by introducing the debate by highlighting: on the one hand singularist reductionist strategies towards plural devices; on the other, arguments put forward by philosophical logicians to defend the need to take plural devices at face value. I argue that stronger formulations of the latter are needed, because they hinge on contingent claims. I then conclude by providing and defending a candidate formulation that can meet the desideratum of modal strength.</p>
Luca Zanetti	<p>The Adoption Problem and Computability</p> <p>Kripke's adoption problem is that "certain logical principles cannot be adopted, because, if a subject already infer according with them, then no adoption is needed, and if the subject does not infer in accordance with them, no adoption is possible" (Padró, 2015). This paper has four parts. In Part I I claim that what the adoption problem really shows is that logical principles are transcendental. In part II I introduce Universal Turing Machines (UTM). In Part III I argue that UTM can adopt a logic. Finally, in Part IV I show some consequences for logical transcendentalism.</p>
John Heron	<p>Abductive philosophy and philosophical explanation</p> <p>According to a popular picture of philosophical methodology, it proceeds on an abductive basis. We pick between rival, empirically equivalent, theories based on one candidate offering the best explanation of some data. An underappreciated challenge is that we currently lack a good account of what it is for a theory to philosophically explain. In this paper I argue that the abductive philosopher owes us such an account.</p>
David Boylan	

Session Title: Philosophy of Time

Name	Title and Abstract
John Pemberton	<p>Aristotle's temporal holism</p> <p>Let an entity be <i>lasting</i> if it exists through time and is ontologically prior to its temporal parts. Let <i>temporal holism</i> be the view that concrete things are lasting. This paper argues that Aristotle is a temporal holist. This claim has implications for our understanding of Aristotle's ontology, and licenses the possibility of developing temporal holist contemporary ontologies.</p>
Emily Thomas	<p>Mary Calkins, Victoria Welby, and the Spatialisation of Time</p> <p>Around 1900, British philosopher Victoria Welby, and American philosopher Mary Calkins, clashed over the 'spatialisation' of time. This paper contextualises, studies, and compares, their accounts of time. There are no studies of Calkins on this issue, yet I argue her 1899 account is novel: her psychology-to-metaphysics strategy is pioneering. Against existing scholarship, I argue Welby's 1907 work on time is primarily metaphysical, advocating spatialisation of time so radical she takes time to be unreal. Further, the ultimate source of the Welby-Calkins clash lies in metaphysics.</p>
Giacomo Giannini, Donatella Donati	<p>Dispositionalism's (Grand)Daddy Issues: Time Travel as a Necessary Mask</p> <p>Dispositionalism (the view that powers ground metaphysical modality) is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel. We offer a potentiality-based version of the grandfather paradox and show that Dispositionalism prevents the adoption of the standard solutions. This is because time travel is an instance of the problem of necessary masks for Dispositionalism. Thus, either we abandon some central tenets of Dispositionalism, or we have to deem time travel impossible.</p>
Markus Herrmann	<p>My Odd Spatio-temporal Nature</p> <p>Normally, we can deduce the properties of a spatio-temporal particular from the properties of its parts. However, there is a special class of properties where this is not possible – namely such properties that make use of first-person reference (further called I-properties). The reason for their odd nature is that the</p>

	referent of an I-property and the entity that has it is one and the same. Because of this, a transfer of an I-property from a part to the whole and vice versa results in the absurd consequence of a change of its truth conditions.
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Session Title: Virtuous Agents

Name	Title and Abstract
I Xuan Chong	<p>On Aristotle's distinction between wisdom and cleverness</p> <p>This paper discusses Aristotle's distinction between wisdom and cleverness in relation to the debate about Aristotle's theory of practical reasoning. The "Non-Intellectualists" in this debate think that the practical intellect (in Aristotle) does not deliberate the ends, but the "Intellectualists" think it does. I will argue against two Non-Intellectualist accounts of the wisdom/cleverness distinction: the "Humean" interpretation considers wisdom as cleverness-employed-correctly, but fails to acknowledge the mean-determining function of the practical intellect and how wisdom secures "practical truth". The "sub-Humean" interpretation is able to accommodate the mean-determining function of the practical intellect, but it fails to fully capture the function of wisdom.</p>
Li-Jen Huang	<p>From Decision to Action – An Interpretation on the Critical Role of τὸ θυμοειδές in the Republic</p> <p>This paper aims to point out and interpret the many roles a souls' spirited part (τὸ θυμοειδές) plays in the <i>Republic</i>. I suggest that τὸ θυμοειδές contains both rational and irrational aspects, and is also implied as "naturally" connected to Justice. The arguments in this paper will lead to three points: (1) τὸ θυμοειδές may be decisive in triggering a person's actions (2) Poetic languages can tame the spirited part. (3) A good training for τὸ θυμοειδές can help someone act justly without really knowing what Justice is.</p>
Alejandro Hortal	<p>Aristotelian Nudges: Using Choice Architecture to Form Virtuous Citizens</p> <p>Nudges are policy interventions that change people's behaviors and habits by organizing the choice environment. Their objective is to facilitate the right behavior. Nudges are used to boost vaccinations, increase contributions to retirement accounts, or improve healthy habits in citizens. Considering the increasing number of agencies using them, some authors (Niker 2018) have wondered about the possibility of using nudges to develop virtues. This paper aims to answer that question, arguing that nudges efficiently form virtuous people in an Aristotelian sense. Nudges can remediate the effects of akrasia and foster habit formation while respecting people's autonomy and rational deliberation.</p>
James Laing	<p>On True Glory</p> <p>In this short paper, I outline an argument for the thought that a virtuous agent will not be non-instrumentally concerned with the way they appear to others. After explaining how a standard charge to the 'approbative desires' is avoided by Adam Smith in his discussion of 'the lover of true glory', I outline what I take to be the deeper charge against these desires which applies equally to the lover of 'true glory' as to the lover of 'mere glory'.</p>

Session Title: Aesthetics/Good and Evil

Name	Title and Abstract
Jack Symes	<p>The Combined Challenge: How to Present the Evil-god Challenge</p> <p>The evil-god challenge asks why belief in a good-god is significantly more reasonable than belief in an evil-god. There are several variations of this challenge in the literature. This paper separates the different challenges before objecting to its most popular formulation (the 'absurdity challenge'). I conclude with the suggestion that two (strong) versions of the challenge are presented simultaneously: not as a dilemma (a genuine choice) but concurrently (as a 'combined challenge').</p>

James H. P. Lewis	<p>Stigma in the aesthetics of friendship</p> <p>Despite our best intentions, our aesthetic judgements of other people are affected by systems of social stigma such as ableism and racism. What's more, those judgements play central roles in supporting and making sense of our attitudes to other people, such as our love of our friends. I consider three ways in which one might respond to the apparent problem of stigma in interpersonal aesthetic judgement. Ultimately, I argue for a moderate scepticism, according to which it is possible to make well-founded, trustworthy aesthetic judgements of others, even though some of our judgements are indeed undermined by social stigma.</p>
Brian McElwee	<p>Are there Aesthetic Obligations?</p> <p>In this paper, I argue for three main claims:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. There are <i>moral</i> obligations which are grounded in aesthetic value. 2. There are <i>non-moral</i> obligations (e.g. prudential obligations) which have interesting aesthetic instances. 3. There is reason to doubt that there are <i>sui generis</i> aesthetic obligations.
Uku Tooming	<p>Against the Practice</p> <p>In this paper, I criticise the practice condition of the normative force of aesthetic value according to which an aesthetic value provides an aesthetic reason for an agent only if responding to that reason promotes the agent's performance in the relevant aesthetic practice. I argue that this condition faces a counterexample when we consider a case in which one has an aesthetic reason to appreciate some aesthetic good that is embedded in a problematic practice that one actively rejects and should reject.</p>

Session Title: Responsibility

Name	Title and Abstract
Benjamin James Mullins	<p>THE INEFFICACY ARGUMENT (AND HOW TO RESPOND TO IT)</p> <p>In certain circumstances, many individual acts can lead to a morally undesirable outcome even though no individual act makes a difference to that outcome. In these scenarios, there is an argument used to justify an agent's non-contribution which is puzzling. This argument claims that while many actions would certainly be bad in their outcome, my contribution is inefficacious, and so there is no reason for me (not) to act this way. The problem is that if we all think like this, then we end up collectively causing bad outcomes which could have just as easily been avoided. However, in this paper, I argue that this argument cannot consistently be held just in case an agent judges that lots of others should act in ways which avoid the morally undesirable outcome.</p>
Edgar Phillips	<p>Addressing the Past</p> <p>Khoury and Matheson have recently argued that responsibility over time is sustained by psychological continuity, meaning psychological change can render an agent no longer responsible for their past actions. I argue that this account rests on a mistaken conception of blame and blameworthiness as concerned with the agent's moral character rather than the moral significance of the action itself. I bring this out through considering the nature of the victim's anger and the wrongdoer's remorse, and the way these seek resolution not merely in change on the part of the latter but in their repentance, atonement and reparation.</p>
Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette	<p>HISTORY EXEMPTS, STRUCTURE EXCUSES</p> <p>Does responsibility have historical requirements such as not having been manipulated? We can answer this difficult question more easily if we replace it with three questions: is a bad history (like manipulation) a justification? Is it an excuse? Or is it an exemption?</p>
Michael Da Silva	<p>Autonomous Artificial Intelligence and Liability</p> <p>Christian List argues that responsibility gaps created by viewing artificial intelligence (AI) as intentional agents are problematic enough that regulators should only permit the use of autonomous AI in high-stakes settings where AI is designed to be moral or a liability transfer agreement will fill any gaps. This work challenges List's proposed condition. A requirement for 'moral' AI is too onerous given technical challenges and other ways to check AI quality. Moreover, transfer agreements only plausibly fill responsibility gaps by</p>

	applying independently-justified group responsibility attribution norms such that AI raises no unique regulatory norms.
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Session Title: Population and Procreation

Name	Title and Abstract
Jonathan Knutzen	<p>Meaning and the Future of Humanity</p> <p>In this paper, I draw on a family of views in the meaning-in-life literature (“objective naturalism”) to offer an account of the meaningfulness of large-scale processes, like scientific and moral progress. I also argue that concerns about the meaningfulness of such processes play an underappreciated role in reflections on what is at stake in human survival.</p>
Felix Pinkert, Martin Sticker	<p>Climate change and permissible procreation – The collective obligation to reach Net Zero</p> <p>A prominent position in climate ethics and activism argues that there is a significant connection between procreation and increased carbon emissions, and that this connection supports an ethical case for having fewer children. Against this “proclimate antinatalism”, we argue that this connection is weaker than assumed, and that due to its malleability, the connection cuts the other way: Rather than supporting an ethical case for having fewer children, it supports a collective obligation to move society to net zero carbon emissions, so that procreation becomes carbon neutral.</p>
David Lindeman	<p>A Comment on Benatar’s ‘Why it is Better Never to Come into Existence’</p> <p>I argue that David Benatar’s master argument for the position that it is better never to come into existence has a fatal defect. It requires that we secure reference with ‘the never existent’, whereas no reference can be secured. While we can imagine, contrary to fact, those who exist (‘existers’) or have existed (‘has-beens’) (or, perhaps, those who will exist, ‘the not-yeters’) never existing, we cannot imagine those who in fact never exist (‘the never-existers’) existing or not. Benatar acknowledges that there is ‘something odd’ here but plots no escape from the problem. There is none.</p>
Joseph Millum	<p>Health spending and the non-identity problem</p> <p>There is no philosophical consensus on the correct solution to the non-identity problem. Views on it vary widely. Meanwhile, non-identity appears highly relevant to societal problems that require action now, such as how to respond to climate change or whether to allocate scarce resources to providing expensive fertility treatments. How should governments act in the face of uncertainty about which of very different philosophical views is correct? In this paper, I consider a case concerning government health spending that clearly implicates non-identity—allocating resources to prevent congenital Zika syndrome—and propose a solution that is neutral regarding the right solution to the non-identity problem.</p>

Session Title: Harming

Name	Title and Abstract
Brian Berkey	<p>Autonomous Vehicle Algorithms, Respect for Humanity, and Saving the Greater Number</p> <p>Scharding claims that reflection on Judith Thomson’s “new trolley problem” suggests that autonomous vehicles ought to be programmed to respond to trade-off crash scenarios by applying a proportional risk algorithm. She argues that this algorithm is ethically preferable to one that would kill fewer people because it is consistent with respect for the humanity of all involved, while the alternative is not. I argue that even if Scharding is correct that respect for humanity requires a proportional risk standard in the new trolley problem, it provides no reason not to choose an AV algorithm that would kill the fewest people.</p>
Theron Pummer	<p>Contrastive Consent and Secondary Permissibility</p> <p>Consider the following case:</p>

	<p><i>TurnHurl</i>: A trolley is about to kill five innocent strangers. You can turn the trolley onto me, saving the five and killing me. You can instead hurl me at the trolley, saving the five and paralyzing me.</p> <p>In this case, it is permissible to save the five by hurling me at the trolley. But if hurling me at the trolley were the <i>only</i> way to save the five, it'd be impermissible to do so. What explains this? I argue that this is explained by the morally transformative power of <i>contrastive consent</i>.</p>
Gerald Lang	<p>Distributing Defensive Liability</p> <p>Some hold that defensive liability should be analysed in distributive terms, or that defensive liability is fundamentally a problem of distributive justice. I argue that this approach cannot be sustained. It encourages us to think of the harms in defensive cases as a kind of <i>fait accompli</i>, the easy avoidance of which now matters to who should bear defensive liability. But that cannot be right. The fact that I can easily avoid a harm cannot displace the question of what justified my exposure to it in the first place.</p>
Maximilian Kiener	<p>Strict Moral Answerability</p> <p>Bernard Williams described the case of a 'lorry driver who, through no fault of his, runs over a child' (Williams, 1981, p. 28). In this paper, I pursue two aims. First, I motivate a puzzle about Williams's case, which I call the <i>Lorry Driver Paradox</i>, and second, I offer a solution to it that develops a novel form of moral responsibility, which I call strict moral answerability.</p>

Session Title: Moral Language

Name	Title and Abstract
Benjamin Marschall	<p>Readymades and Realism</p> <p>The sentences we use to describe reality have structure: they consist of names, predicates, logical connectives. Are there worldly entities mirroring this linguistic structure? I will reconstruct what I consider to be the strongest argument in favour of objective structure: the <i>argument from basic realism</i>, according to which those who reject objective structure cannot explain how one can misdescribe the world. I then show that the argument relies on a contentious metasemantic assumption: that the meanings of names, predicates, and the like is prior to the meaning of whole sentences. Enemies of objective structure should reject this assumption.</p>
Ravi Thakral	<p>How to Challenge Prejudicial Language</p> <p>Significant practical questions arise when we consider normative generic generalizations about different social groups, such as in 'Blacks are violent'. Certain generics of this variety may even express statistically prevalent facts, but such generalizations can transmit harmful beliefs because they can wrongly implicate that the relationship between a social group and a property is something deeper than mere statistical correlation. It is far from clear what ordinary language users should do to mitigate this harm. In this paper, I develop an account of how ordinary language users can challenge such ethically contentious speech without prohibiting them or targeting them by counterexample.</p>
Poppy Mankowitz	<p>Absolutely Good</p> <p>Is anything good simpliciter? And does something that counts as 'good' in one context count as such in any context? Traditionally, a number of meta-ethicists have given positive answers. But more recently, some philosophers have used observations based on natural language to argue that things can only count as 'good' relative to ends and contextual thresholds. I will use work from contemporary linguistics to argue that 'good' is ambiguous and that it has a moral disambiguation with a context-independent meaning. This suggests that things <i>can</i> count as 'good' simpliciter in a context-independent manner.</p>
Ashley Shaw	<p>The Necessity of 'Need'</p> <p>Need ascriptions have not received much philosophical attention despite the normative significance attached to the concept by some philosophers. I raise a puzzle about need ascriptions and motivate an account of need ascriptions that solves it. I show how the account advances our understanding of the syntax and semantics of 'need' sentences, and the function of claims of need in ethical discourse.</p>

Session Title: Well-Being and Goodness

Name	Title and Abstract
David Bather Woods	<p>There are Worse Things than Ruining Your Life</p> <p>I defend the title claim by considering what it is to ruin your life. I conclude that while ruining your life is very bad for you, there are still worse things that can happen to you. A meaningless life is a distinct and worse possibility that philosophers haven't taken seriously. I do not deny that some ruined lives can get no worse, but this is not due to ruination <i>per se</i>.</p>
Gwen Bradford	<p>IRREPLACEABLE VALUE</p> <p>If the <i>Mona Lisa</i>, the Sistine Chapel, the sarcophagus of Tutankhamun, or the Sword of Goujian were destroyed, nothing could replace them. New works of art that are even more impressive may be created, which may replenish the value in the world in <i>quantity</i>, but they would not fully replace the loss. Works of art and historical artifacts have <i>irreplaceable value</i>. But just what is irreplaceable value? This paper presents perhaps the first analysis. Irreplaceable value is a matter of intrinsic value in virtue of unreinstantiable good-making properties, which give rise to reasons to preserve and protect.</p>
Andrés G. Garcia	<p>Millian Value Relations Generalised and Interpreted</p> <p>John Stuart Mill (2008) maintains that pleasure achieved because of intellectual pursuits is of a higher value than pleasure achieved because of physical pursuits. He suggests not only that the former kind of pleasure is better than the latter, but that no amount of the latter kind of pleasure is better than the former. Some philosophers have endeavoured to clarify the phenomenon of superiority that he invokes by illuminating its structure and ground. Arrhenius & Rabinowicz (2005, 2015) are examples. They distinguish different kinds of superiority and interpret these in terms of <i>diminishing marginal value</i>. The suggestion is that if one item is superior to another, then each addition of the latter has a diminishing contribution to the value of its total number. They also take inspiration from Griffin (1986) and distinguish between a strong and weak version (hereafter referred to as varieties of 'M-superiority').</p>
Pascal Brixel	<p>Two Faces of Alienated Labour in Marx</p> <p>Readers of Marx have tended to understand alienated labour as labour which affords the worker no scope for self-realisation. This explains why labour is alienated when its content is extremely impoverished. However, Marx also seems to think that <i>paid labour</i> is alienated as such, regardless of its content. In this talk, I give an account of the alienation of paid labour based on its formal motivational structure rather than on a substantive conception of human self-realisation. Paid labour, I argue, is alienated because—as a species of incentivised activity—it is motivated by a distinctively and radically external end.</p>

Session Title: Ethics and Agency

Name	Title and Abstract
Daniele Bruno	<p>Risk, Recklessness, and Objectivism about Ought</p> <p>One classic objection to Objectivism about ought is that it recommends unconscionably risky actions in so-called three-option-cases. Davide Fassio (2021) denies this orthodoxy and claims that Objectivism can allow for a class of what he calls <i>no-recklessness norms</i> that allow some perspectival facts. In this paper, I critically evaluate Fassio's proposal to draw some more general lessons about Objectivism's ability to deal with risk and recklessness. I make an important and neglected distinction between two kinds of recklessness and show that the one which is required for extensionally adequate verdicts in all three-option cases is ultimately incompatible with objectivism.</p>
Daniel Drucker, Henry Ian Schiller	<p>Real Platonism Has Never Been Tried</p> <p>Our goal is to elaborate and defend a view of rational desire that takes inspiration from Plato: on our view, the rational person has only one desire, and this desire never changes. In setting this view up, we equip it with tools from the best contemporary work on attitude verbs and desire formation. In doing so, we hope to show that Plato's remarks on desire can be developed into not only a coherent theory, but a plausible one.</p>

Lizzy Ventham	<p>Moral Concern and Empathy</p> <p>Contemporary literature criticises a necessary link between empathy and genuine moral concern. If there is such a necessary link, many argue, it must come in the developmental stages of our moral capacities, rather than being found in the mental states that make up our motivating reasons. This paper goes against that trend, arguing that critics have not considered how wide-ranging the mental states are that make up a person's reasons. In particular, when such mental states are unconscious or occur far prior to the decision to act.</p>
Sarah Hoffman	<p>Psychedelics and Kantian Morality</p> <p>Evidence indicates that increases in well-being after psychedelic therapy are best predicted by the induction of a mystical-type experience. This opens psychedelic therapy to the objection that it operates through the induction of delusions. Kantian moral theory suggests a generalization of this objection to psychedelic use: psychedelic use undermines our rational capacities. There is however a Kantian case to be made in favour of psychedelics in which Letheby's idea that psychedelics confer epistemic benefits can be extended to benefits to practical reason. Psychedelics are arguably not only morally permissible for a Kantian but may have a role in moral development.</p>

Session Title: Obligations and Oughts

Name	Title and Abstract
Eline Gerritsen	<p>Taking Conventions Seriously</p> <p>Informal conventional norms regulate many aspects of our lives. They tell us how to approach others, how to dress, how much space to give strangers on a sidewalk, and shape many other types of actions taking place in a social context. We take many conventional norms seriously in our behaviour, complying with their demands and sanctioning others who violate them. In the meta normative literature, however, conventional norms are assumed to lack normative authority. In this talk, I explain how this dismissal of conventional norms goes hand in hand with a demanding but common conception of authoritative normativity, discuss why we should take conventional norms more seriously than this, and show how an alternative account of authoritative normativity allows us to do just that. First, I introduce the distinction between norms that are authoritatively normative and those that are merely formally normative. I also characterise the category of conventional norms I focus on. In the second section, I discuss how conventional norms are standardly dismissed as merely formally normative. This is related to the common conception of authoritative normativity as necessarily irreducible and intrinsic. In the third section, I argue that the common meta normative treatment of conventional norms—even when they are argued to have authority derived from their relation to moral norms—does not reflect our experience of these norms or their importance. Finally, I show how naturalist commitment-based accounts of authoritative normativity have more plausible implications for which conventional norms have genuine authority, and why.</p>
Lisa Bastian	<p>What it means to be strict</p> <p>In normative theorising, we often refer to the “strictness” or “slackness” of normative notions. However, these properties have received insufficient attention and lack clear characterisation. This paper addresses this shortcoming in two ways. One, it proposes a definition of strictness which synthesises the various uses in the literature and draws a helpful parallel to the literature on excuses. Two, it explores a number of possible explanations of a notion's strictness. It rejects the common assumption that strictness always goes hand in hand with pro toto notions and ultimately argues that strictness should be understood as a sui generis normative property.</p>
Thomas Schmidt	<p>Supererogation and the Structure of Reasons</p> <p>I bring resources from the theory of reasons to bear on solving paradoxes of supererogation. The main idea is to combine the view that moral status is determined by reasons on the one hand with specific principles of reason transmission that are justifiable on independent grounds on the other. Doing so results, as I argue, in an account that makes sense of puzzling cases involving supererogation and that is to be preferred over rival views.</p>
Janis David Schaab	<p>Binding Oneself to Oneself</p> <p>This article defends the possibility of putting oneself under an obligation to oneself, and its importance for the possibility of obligations to oneself. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, I defend the importance of the bindingness of obligations to oneself. Second, I defend the importance of the</p>

	contemporaneity of the binding and the bound self. Third, I defend the possibility that duties which are self-imposed in this way are also owed to oneself.
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Session Title: Practical Rationality

Name	Title and Abstract
Sameer Bajaj	<p>Does the Consequentialist Defense of a Duty to Vote Succeed?</p> <p>The consequentialist challenge to an individual duty to vote holds that because the odds of casting the deciding vote in an election are miniscule, the costs always outweigh the benefits. The consequentialist defense of a duty to vote responds that the benefits often outweigh the costs. This is because the odds and stakes of casting a decisive vote are often higher than the initial challenge assumes. I argue that the consequentialist defense of a duty to vote relies on problematic empirical assumptions. Moreover, it rests on a fundamentally mistaken view of how the moral demands of improving political institutions distribute.</p>
Edward Elliott	<p>Non-Imposition Non-Imposed</p> <p>Arrow's General Possibility Theorem for social choice theory makes use of three key constraints: Weak Pareto, Non-Dictatorship, and Binary Independence. Wilson's later version of the theorem drops Weak Pareto, replacing it with Non-Imposition. In this paper, we show how to have a version of Wilson's theorem without Non-Imposition. Doing so requires a slight—but independently very reasonable—strengthening of the remaining conditions; most notably, we motivate a very natural strengthening of the Non-Dictatorship constraint.</p>
Max Hayward	<p>Team-Reasoning and Act-Utilitarianism</p> <p>This paper has three goals. I argue:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. That there is such a thing as “team-reasoning,” which is irreducible to individual reasoning. b. That there are contexts in which team-reasoning is required in order to produce optimal outcomes. c. That this constitutes a reason to reject the act-utilitarian account of moral reasons. <p>In other words, if we act in accordance with the reasons that act-utilitarianism says that we possess, then we will fail to bring about the outcomes with the greatest utility – and thus, I infer, people who care about utility ought to reject the act-utilitarian account of reasons.</p>
Giacomo Melis	<p>The relation between reflective and unreflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons</p> <p>I defend two claims. First, I argue that the capacity for reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons is grounded in one's capacity to respond to epistemic reasons unreflectively. Second, I suggest that, to the extent that very young children and non-human animals are taken to be capable to respond to epistemic reasons unreflectively, they may be considered epistemically rational agents in the same sense that applies to adult humans.</p>

Session Title: Emotions

Name	Title and Abstract
Frodo Podschwadek	<p>From Boredom to Authenticity Bubbles: The Implication of Boredom-Induced Social Media Use for Individual Autonomy</p> <p>In this paper, we argue that boredom can be an important experience that contributes to people's autonomous agency by providing authentic motivation, and that strategies of social media providers to bind users' attention to their platforms undermine this authenticity. As discussed in social epistemology and media ethics for a while now, such strategies can lead to so-called epistemic or filter bubbles. Our analysis of the relation between boredom and social media use focuses on a similarly impairing effect of social media on users' autonomy, which we call authenticity bubbles.</p>

Claire Kirwin	<p>Worlds Collided: Love and Value</p> <p>Kirwin (forthcoming) introduces the notion of 'value expertise': different people, she argues, have different kinds and degrees of ability to see, understand, experience, and engage with, different forms of value. In this paper, I apply Kirwin's basic model to the topic of love. The value expertise account, I claim, helps to solve a familiar puzzle about love, and also allows us to capture an important aspect of the nature of <i>mutual</i> love that has thus far gone underappreciated in the literature. At the same time, I take my discussion to offer further development of the nature of value expertise.</p>
Katharina Anna Sodoma	<p>Emotional Gaslighting and Affective Empathy</p> <p>Gaslighting is a form of manipulation that aims to drive a target "out of their mind" by systematically undermining their confidence in their reactions, perceptions, memories, and judgments. I distinguish a specific form of gaslighting, "emotional gaslighting", which aims at undermining a target's confidence in their emotional reactions and the evaluative judgments they make based on these reactions. I argue that affective empathy that leads to endorsement of a target's emotion can play an important role as an antidote to emotional gaslighting because it reassures a target in their ability to make evaluative judgments based on their emotional reactions.</p>
Carlota Serrahima	<p>Painful mood: menstrual discomfort against a sharp distinction between pains and moods</p> <p>A common assumption in philosophical discussions on affectivity is that pains and moods are disjoint mental kinds. This paper focuses on one affective phenomenon, dysmenorrhea, commonly known as <i>menstrual pain</i>. The paper shows that dysmenorrhea participates in characteristics of both pains and moods, and argues that, phenomenologically, pain- and mood-related symptoms in dysmenorrhea are experienced as a unitary affective phenomenon. It also offers empirical support for this view. This invites a revision of the taxonomy of affective states assumed by philosophers.</p>

Session Title: Property and Future People

Name	Title and Abstract
Andreas L. Mogensen	<p>Just saving in non-ideal theory</p> <p>I consider and respond to challenges that arise in attempting to spell out the practical significance for agents placed in non-ideal circumstances of conclusions concerning intergenerational justice derived in ideal theory: specifically, in relation to Rawls's Just Savings Principle. I note that non-ideal theory as applied to questions of intergenerational justice cannot accommodate the view that the ideal justice represents the long-term goal of institutional reform, but is amenable to the view that ideal justice ought to be approximated as nearly as possible. I sketch a concrete proposal for what this would mean in relation to just saving.</p>
Rebecca Lowe	<p>Can the Lockean proviso justify private property?</p> <p>The classic Lockean solution to addressing the costs that private property imposes on those outside the owner/owned-thing relation is found in the 'enough and as good' proviso ('EAAG'). I contend, however, that EAAG cannot enable property-owners to address all the 'others-related' costs that individual ownership imposes. And that even if it could, this would not amount to providing moral justification for individual ownership.</p>
Stefano Lo Re	<p>A Kantian Argument for Sustainable Property Use</p> <p>The paper offers a new argument for a duty of sustainable property use based on Kant's legal-political philosophy. In doing so, it contributes to the project of extending the application of Kant's philosophy to environmental issues so as to include his legal-political philosophy. My argument is premised on the temporal dimension of Kant's property argument, and is fully consistent with the exclusively interpersonal nature of freedom at play in his <i>Doctrine of Right</i>.</p>
Tomasz Żuradzki	<p>Future-oriented prioritarianism under uncertainty: who are the worst off?</p> <p>Distributive theories recommend the allocation of resources based on recipients' characteristics that vary across possible worlds that decision-makers can bring about through their different distributive interventions (or lack of them). This paper concentrates on one version of prioritarianism that defines the worst off by referring to their prospects in different possible worlds. We show various ways to delineate the worst off in the relevant sense, and we explain this phenomenon, referring to discussions in the</p>

	philosophy of medicine about the meaning of aggregate data for individual patients. The paper demonstrates how normative views on distribution priorities depend on the interpretations of probability, which is a complex and plural notion.
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Session Title: Democratic Theory

Name	Title and Abstract
Matthieu Debief	<p>The political nature of philanthropy</p> <p>I offer a political definition of philanthropy as acts carrying a form of authority characterized by two individually necessary but jointly sufficient constitutive rules: plutocracy and third personality. By plutocracy, I understand that philanthropy's authority is derived from material resources that are external to the democratic decision process. By third personality, I mean that the authority claims of philanthropic actions are generally extraneous to a right-based relation. These two elements contrast with the mutual exercise of authority and the second-personal form of accountability that typically underpin liberal democratic decision-making.</p>
Firat Akova	<p>Artificially Sentient Beings: Moral, Political, Legal Issues</p> <p>The emergence of artificially sentient beings raises moral, political, legal issues. First, it may be difficult to understand the well-being of artificially sentient beings. In that case, as a theory of well-being, hedonism may need to expand the very meaning of happiness and suffering. Second, we may have to compare the claims of artificially sentient beings with the claims of humans. This calls for interspecies aggregation, which is a neglected form of aggregation. Lastly, there are practical problems to address, for instance, whether to include artificially sentient beings in the political decision-making processes, and how to protect them from discrimination.</p>
Mihailis Diamantis	<p>COLLECTIVE STATES AND INDIVIDUAL ROLES</p> <p>Most realists about collective entities accept the intuitive proposition that if some sufficient percentage of group members does or thinks something, then their group does too. I argue that this proposition is false. There are straightforward counterexamples in which every member of a group does something or thinks something, but the group itself does not. The counterexamples arise because of an oversight that goes to the very heart of what groups are: group members sometimes occupy roles as members of their group and sometimes solely occupy roles as private individuals.</p>
Steph Marston	<p>Rethinking Populism: Lessons from Spinoza</p> <p>The paper uses the epistemological foundations of Spinoza's political philosophy as the basis for a productive understanding of populism today. An interpretation of Spinoza's political writings is proposed in which a state stands as the enactment of inadequate ideas of empowerment. Seen through this lens, populism can be seen as indicating features of civic life which genuinely fail some sub-groups of a population. The paradox of populism is that it may stand in the way of resolving the problems it reveals. Nonetheless, it provides insights into the limitations of existent political systems.</p>

Session Title: Justice and Special Circumstances

Name	Title and Abstract
Carl Mildenberger	<p>"Pure" procedural justice?</p> <p>In this paper, I argue against the Rawlsian conception of pure procedural justice. The way Rawls defines pure procedural justice is misleading in that it suggests a difference of kind between pure and perfect procedural justice. However, I show that there only is a difference of degree. Pure procedural justice is not really "pure" in the sense that it does not rely on end-state principles of justice to bring about just outcomes. It only does so to a lesser extent than perfect procedural justice.</p>

Simone Gubler and Ryan Doody	<p>A Decent Living</p> <p>We defend minimum wage policies against a “Progressive Objection”. The Objection contends (1) that we should be particularly attentive to the needs of the least advantaged, (2) that while the institution of a minimum wage benefits some low-wage workers, it does so at the expense of the even less well-off; and so, (3) we ought to reject the minimum wage. Against this contention, we argue that those sympathetic to the background commitments of the progressive position can accept the welfarist consequences of the minimum wage.</p>
Giulio Fornaroli	<p>Neglecting Others and Making Up for It: The Idea of a Corrective Duty</p> <p>In this paper, I offer an alternative account of the <i>ground</i> and <i>content</i> of corrective duties – the moral neglect account. I first demonstrate that three prominent attempts at explaining the nature and function of corrective duties – the Aristotelian restorative paradigm, the Kantian rights-based account and the more recent continuity thesis of Raz and Gardner – are unsatisfactory. I then present three advantages of the alternative neglect account: it can better explain both what <i>wronging</i> is and why and how it can be corrected, it can account for the corrective role of apologies and, finally, it fits perfectly with the idea that both wronging and corrections are inherently related to resentment.</p>
Paul Rezkalla	<p>Family Over Strangers? An Evolutionary Case Against Partiality</p> <p>In this paper I offer a new evolutionary debunking argument against our intuitions and practices regarding special duties and obligations to kin. Humans feel a tremendous pull to favor our relatives and those closest to us over strangers and others who may be equally, if not even more so, in need of our resources. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I show that our intuitions and practices about who to help in dire situations map on almost perfectly to what is predicted by Hamilton’s rule and the theory of kin selection. Second, I show that there is a surprisingly profound absence of non-consequentialist argumentation offered in defense of our special obligations to kin. I conclude that partiality towards kin at best rests on thin philosophical ice.</p>

Session Title: Philosophy of Science

Name	Title and Abstract
Fabio Tononi	<p>HEIDEGGER ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE</p> <p>Since the emergence of Greek philosophy, the relationship between philosophy and science has varied considerably. For example, the idea of science in Scholasticism differs from that which took shape at the time of GalileoGalilei, or in the period of the atomic physics of Niels Bohr and Werner Karl Heisenberg. Today, various scholars suggest that philosophy has been replaced by science, whereas others do not see a real difference between the two. Martin Heidegger devoted his attention to this relationship. In a series of texts, Heidegger defines the essence of philosophy and that of science, distinguishing their respective features. Heidegger argues that philosophy deals with thinking, whereas science deals with knowledge. In this paper, I will focus on Heidegger’s view on the difference between philosophy and science – a topic that has recently found new consideration – while also addressing the following questions: (i) Why is it relevant to address this issue today? (ii) Does the current multidisciplinary approach – such as the dialogue between philosophy and science in experimental metaphysics – challenge Heidegger’s idea of philosophy and science? And (iii) what is the task of philosophy in an age in which science seems to triumph? Building on Heidegger’s thought, I propose that a distinction between philosophy (which is grounded on reason) and science (which is based on experiments and empirical data), as well as an ontological definition, is fruitful for both disciplines in clarifying a series of crucial epistemological issues.</p>
Petter Sandstad	<p>Lowe and Aristotle on Matter</p> <p>I develop an account of matter and hylomorphism, suggested by Lowe, where matter is understood as a substance’s material parts. The view differs from traditional account of hylomorphism (e.g. Oderberg) in that it both rejects prime matter and the compositional view of substances. It also differs from other mereological accounts (e.g. Fine and Koslicki), in that form is not understood as a part of the substance and that substances are not compositional. To allow for substantial change, the distinction between dependent and independent parts is added to the account. Lastly, a solution to elemental transformation is presented.</p>

William Morgan	<p>Biological Individuality, Pluralism, and Personal Identity</p> <p>This paper argues that the most popular answer to the question, ‘what is an organism?’ in the philosophy of biology – Pluralism - is in tension with our being animals. The upshot is that if Pluralism is true, we ought to accept that it is indeterminate what kind of thing we are.</p>
Charlotte Erika Zito	<p>Anaxagoras, Aristotle, fundamental particles and dispositions: a new argument against the infinite regress objection</p> <p>The aim of this paper is to investigate the metaphysics of properties of fundamental particles and to provide an innovative defence of dispositional essentialism against the argument of infinite regress by Psillos [Psillos, 2006]. My strategy will consist of two steps: I will argue that fundamental particles cannot be distinguished from their essential properties following Aristotle’s theory of essences, <i>Metaphysics</i>, VII.6; then I will claim that leptons, quarks and bosons possess only one state by adopting Anaxagoras’ metaphysics of <i>active powers</i> [Marmodoro, 2017] that together with the Aristotelian conception of essences rules out any vicious regress.</p>

Session Title: Ontology

Name	Title and Abstract
Antonio Salgado Borge	<p>Spinoza on Attribute Unity</p> <p>This paper argues that Spinoza can cogently account for the unity of numerically distinct attributes and the unity of the mind and the body. It shows that, just as he does with composition, Spinoza believes that constitution can be a many-to-one relation accounted in causal terms. However, it posits that for Spinoza composition involves the unity of a plurality of things in virtue of their joint production of an effect of which each is an incomplete cause, whereas constitution involves the unity of a plurality of things in virtue of each being the complete cause of equally many equal effects.</p>
Radivoj Stupar	<p>Qualitative persistence and enduring tropes</p> <p>In this paper, I will discuss an argument for the existence of tropes proposed by Douglas Ehring (1997, ch. 4; 2011, ch. 2). According to Ehring, we need to posit enduring tropes in order to account for the phenomenon he calls qualitative persistence – briefly, the phenomenon of objects keeping their qualitative profile when they are not interfered with. In contrast, I will argue that enduring tropes are neither necessary nor sufficient for qualitative persistence.</p>
King-Ho Leung	<p>Moten, Sartre, and Schelling on Nothingness</p> <p>Contemporary critical theory and black studies have witnessed a surge in theoretical accounts of “blackness” as “nothingness”. Drawing on the work of the leading black studies theorist Fred Moten, this paper offers a philosophical analysis of the postulation of blackness as nothingness in comparison to the “canonical” philosophical accounts of Sartre and Schelling. In doing so, this paper highlights how Moten’s distinction between “absolute” and “relative” nothingness can supplement recent philosophical interests in the metaphysics of nothingness (e.g., Bernstein; Mumford; Priest), which can in turn foster further dialogues between analytic philosophy and other contemporary theoretical inquiries.</p>
Michael Jaworzyn	<p>The Finitude of Cartesian Minds and their Dependence on God: Descartes’ <i>Principles</i> and an Early Commentary</p> <p>There is disagreement regarding how to understand Descartes’s conception of substance, especially regarding the kind of dependence had by created substances on God, which recent scholars have seen variously as a causal, conceptual, modal, or inherence relation. This paper argues that an early commentary on Descartes’ <i>Principles</i> by Arnold Geulincx (1624-69) took the dependence relation in question differently; Geulincx views it as the dependence of the finite on the infinite. His motivation for adopting a <i>prima facie</i> unusual reading of Descartes’ work may be to surreptitiously introduce the idea that created minds are not actually genuine substances.</p>

Session Title: Criminal Law and Punishment

Name	Title and Abstract
Amit Pundik	<p>Predictive Evidence in Criminal Trials: Why criminal law should treat people as if they have unpredictable free will</p> <p>When determining in criminal proceedings whether an individual performed a certain culpable action, predictive evidence is often dismissed. Most apparently, and with only a few exceptions, predictive base-rates are excluded. Using such evidence in court also seems <i>intuitively inappropriate</i>. For example, using the high rate of crimes involving illegal firearms in a certain neighbourhood to convict an individual resident in a crime involving an illegal firearm seems highly objectionable (henceforth, the 'crime-rates scenario'). The objection to such base-rates is not only directed at the sufficiency of such evidence (on the grounds that crime-rates are insufficient on their own to prove that the individual is guilty). The objection also requires that such evidence should not be used at all in determining the individual's guilt: that crime-rates should be <i>inadmissible</i> in criminal proceedings. The hostility of criminal fact-finding toward predictive evidence is also apparent in the deeply-rooted suspicion of bad character and previous convictions.</p>
Mario Günther	<p>Legal Proof is Rational Belief of Guilt</p> <p>We argue that legal proof is tantamount to rational belief of guilt. A defendant should be found guilty just in case it is rational to believe that the defendant is guilty. Our notion of rational belief implies a threshold view on which belief requires high credence, but mere statistical evidence does not give rise to belief.</p>
Daniel Hill, Steve McLeod, and Attila Tanyi	<p>Undercover Policing and 'Dirty Hands': The Case of Legal Entrapment</p> <p>Under a 'dirty hands' model of undercover policing, it inevitably involves situations where whatever the law-enforcement agent does is morally unsavoury. Christopher Nathan contends that this model entails the (in his view objectionable) conclusion that morally wrongful acts are central to undercover policing. We address this criticism, focusing specifically on legal entrapment. Following János Kis, we explain three dilemmatic versions of the 'dirty hands' model. While two emerge as inapplicable, the third has better prospects. Since the third model avoids Nathan's criticism, a viable 'dirty hands' model of legal entrapment remains a possibility.</p>
Nikk Effingham	<p>Why stealing a Wispa bar deserves eternal punishment</p> <p>This paper discusses the problem of hell, defending the Aquinas-Anselm-Edwards response that any immoral act deserves an eternity in hell because it offends God. I discuss three objections, arguing that only one has any bite; even then, it still solves one version of the problem of hell.</p>

Session Title: Representation I

Name	Title and Abstract
Cole Ray Phelps	<p>Aristotle on Varieties of Content in the Various Animals</p> <p>Aristotle takes the position in <i>De Memoria</i> that memory involves grasping both imagistic and propositional content. Given that his account of memory purports to apply to both rational and non-rational animals, this is extremely surprising. For it seems that intaking such a position, Aristotle has exposed himself to the charge that he has ascribed a characteristically rational form of mental content—propositional content—to non-rational animals. I argue that by developing an account of mnemonic content that makes agents responsible for the form of such content, Aristotle manages to avoid this charge. While the content of any particular memory will be coded in a mental representation which both rational and non-rational animals may share, the memory process itself takes place only when agents actualize the content through the exercise of their cognitive faculties. Therefore, since rational and non-rational animals possess different cognitive faculties, Aristotle is able to claim that only rational animals possess the specific cognitive faculties necessary for grasping propositional content when brought to bear on representations. This gives him principled grounds on which to deny that non-rational animals, as well as rational animals experiencing psychological episodes, grasp propositional content in memory, thus allowing him to simultaneously escape disaster and enrich the explanatory resources of his philosophical psychology.</p>

Alison Springle	<p>A Practical Criterion for Perceptual Representation</p> <p>According to representationalists, a sentence in a language and a perceptual experience share in common the fact that they are both representations; they both have intentional contents. But while they are both kinds of representations, they seem to be importantly different kinds of representations. Accordingly, an account of perceptual representation is an account of a kind of representation that, on the one hand, belongs to a wider genus REPRESENTATION in which sentences also partake, and on the other hand, accommodates the features that are distinctive of perceptual experiences. I argue that a commonly used “Veridicality Criterion” criterion for belonging to the genus REPRESENTATION generates a puzzle: if perceptual representations satisfy this criterion, it’s not clear how they can simultaneously instantiate certain distinctive properties of perceptual experiences. To resolve the puzzle, I propose a “Practical Epistemic Access (PEA) Criterion.” I show that different species of representation can be defined in terms of different forms of PEA, and I’ll explain how one such species accommodates the distinctive properties of perceptual experiences. So, The PEA Criterion avoids the puzzle.</p>
Paweł Grad	<p>The Argument from Acquaintance for Perceptual Content</p> <p>This paper reverses the relationalist argument against representational content of experience. Part I presents an argument that if perceptual experience provides acquaintance with mind-independent particulars, then it must have representational content. Part II offers a rejoinder to Charles Travis’s counterargument against perceptual content from Frege’s insight in the epistemic role of perception.</p>
Anna Giustina	<p>INNER ACQUAINTANCE THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS</p> <p>A crucial divide in philosophy of consciousness is whether phenomenal consciousness implies some form of self-consciousness. Disagreement revolves around the following principle:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">IA: For any subject S and conscious state M, M is conscious only if S is aware of M.</p> <p>We may call the relevant awareness of one’s mental states “inner awareness” and the principle “Inner Awareness Principle” (IA).</p> <p>Theorists who do accept the principle have typically tried to explain consciousness in terms of (meta)representation: for any subject S and conscious state M, M is conscious iff S harbors a mental state M* that suitably represents M. On this assumption, the debate has mostly revolved around the relationship between M and M*. On Higher-Order Representationalism, $M \neq M^*$; on Self-Representationalism $M = M^*$.</p> <p>In this paper, I want to explore a <i>third</i> option—one that has received little attention so far. On this view, inner awareness is explained <i>not</i> in meta-representationalist terms, but in terms of the relation of acquaintance (<i>Acquaintance Account</i>):</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">AA: For any subject S and conscious state M, S is aware of M iff S is acquainted with M.</p> <p>An <i>Inner Acquaintance Theory</i> of consciousness (IAT) combines IA and AA:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">IAT: For any subject S and conscious state M, M is conscious iff S is acquainted with M.</p>

Session Title: Social Epistemology

Name	Title and Abstract
Martin Miragoli	<p>FUNCTIONALISM ABOUT GROUP BELIEF</p> <p>In recent years, a novel idea has taken root among epistemologists that understands knowledge as an essentially collective endeavour. This has brought to light a host of stimulating new epistemological issues. Here’s one of them: are groups genuine epistemic agents? Do they have knowledge, belief and justification? Epistemologists who respond to these questions in the positive are split into two main camps: deflationary summativists say that the epistemic status of a group is parasitic on that of its members. Inflationary non-summativists deny this. In this paper I present and evaluate the options on the table and propose a new functionalist account of how groups form their beliefs.</p>
Nick Küspert	<p>Optimism About Moral Testimony</p> <p>Is it admissible to act on the basis of moral knowledge acquired purely through moral testimony? Many are pessimistic about this. Here, I argue that influential moral sources of such pessimism fail to support pessimism about moral testimony. Pessimism about moral testimony on moral grounds holds that testimony-based actions cannot be of moral worth. I argue that while the value of moral worth may be positive, it is minor when compared to acting rightly. Hence, even if there is something sub-optimal in reliance on moral testimony, this rarely (if ever) provides a sufficient reason to reject reliance on moral testimony.</p>

Alexander Dinges	<p>What is the group belief debate about?</p> <p>A growing body of literature addresses the question of what group beliefs are. However, this question seems easily solved. A group belief is a belief held by a group. Moreover, we know what groups and beliefs are from the independent debates on these phenomena. So, what is the group belief debate about? I reject various responses including the idea that the debate on (individual) belief provides only partial definitions of belief and that “belief” is ambiguous or used non-literally in group belief ascriptions. I then suggest an interpretation of the group belief debate in terms of metaphysical grounding.</p>
Murali Ramachandran	<p>The Pertinent Epistemic Blindspot in the Surprise Examination Paradox</p> <p>In the surprise exam paradox students are informed: (E) that they will have an exam one morning the following week, and (S) that they will not know which morning until they get it; they can then apparently deduce that they cannot be set any such exam. We argue that the reasoning gets off the ground only if the students’ knowledge of (E) is robust (in a sense to be explicated); but the reasoning is then blocked because the conjunction [(I <i>robustly know</i> (E)) ∩ (S)] is an <i>epistemic blindspot</i> for any student. This departs from earlier (unsuccessful) epistemic blindspot solutions.</p>

Session Title: Epistemic reasons/justification

Name	Title and Abstract
Ian Church	<p>An Anthropological Challenge for Internalism</p> <p>In this paper, I argue that examples of cultural learning within anthropology pose a challenge to internalism (regarding warrant) in the form of a dilemma: either (i) accept that the anthropological literature highlights a prevalent species of knowledge that internalism is unable to account for or (ii) come up with a principled reason to deny knowledge in those cases, without epistemically wronging the relevant people groups. In §1, I put forward a broadly applicable definition of internalism. In §2, I briefly elucidate a representative example of cultural learning within anthropology. In §3, I unpack the subsequent challenge faced by internalism.</p>
Blake McAllister	<p>Seemings and Truth</p> <p>A belief is epistemically justified only if it bears an adequate connection to truth. Arguably, the truth-connection poses a problem for phenomenal conservatism, which grants some degree of prima facie justification to whatever seems true. Setting aside externalist concerns about reliability, I consider from an internal perspective whether seemings provide an adequate connection to truth. Revising the case of Norman the Clairvoyant, I explain why some think they do not. To the contrary, I argue that seemings elegantly account for the truth-connection while avoiding common skeptical traps. All told, the truth-connection proves a merit of phenomenal conservatism, not a liability.</p>
Robin McKenna	<p>The “Genetic Fallacy” Fallacy</p> <p>This paper looks at the structure of “genealogical debunking” arguments. Such arguments are often said to commit the “genetic fallacy”—the fallacy of arguing that the origins of something discredit it. I argue that this is itself a sort of fallacy, which I call the “‘genetic fallacy’ fallacy”. This “fallacy” is, strictly speaking, really a mistake of interpretation. Genealogical debunking arguments are often better interpreted as having a deductively valid form. I explain what that form is and discuss what would need to be done to defend the premises and so the conclusion of a genealogical debunking argument so construed.</p>
Allie Richards	<p>A Default Logic Approach to Underdetermination</p> <p>The Duhem-Quine thesis is (roughly) the thesis that, when incoming evidence disconfirms the conjunction of a theory and auxiliary hypothesis, there is no way to determine to what degree each conjunct is disconfirmed. That is, there is no way to determine how blame should be distributed among conjuncts. This project examines the Bayesian solution of the Duhem-Quine problem. More specifically, I explore Strevens’ (2001) reformulation of the solution, and analysis of rational blame shifting. I then propose an alternative framework using Horty’s (2012) theory of reasons, formulated in terms of default logic.</p>

Session Title: Modality and Grounding

Name	Title and Abstract
Harry Cleeveley	<p>A Priori Modal Rationalism</p> <p>Modal rationalism is the claim that for any proposition p, if it is ideally conceivable that p, then there is a metaphysically possible world, W, at which p is true. Modal rationalism will be true just if there are no strong <i>a posteriori</i> necessities. But are there any strong necessities? I argue that whether or not there are strong necessities is an <i>a priori</i> matter. One of two things must be the case: either it is <i>a priori</i> that there are strong necessities, or it is <i>a priori</i> that there are none. Thus there is no middle ground in which modal rationalism is a coherent possibility that happens to be false, because there happen to be strong necessities.</p>
Stephan Krämer	<p>Iterating Worldly Ground</p> <p>Suppose that some facts ground another fact. What, if anything, grounds <i>that</i> fact? In my talk I approach this question from the perspective of the <i>truthmaker semantics</i> for (non-iterated) worldly ground and develop an extension of this semantics to iterated statements of ground. The central task here is to provide an account of the truthmakers of grounding claims. After describing such an account, I set out key aspects of the logic of iterated ground that it generates, and relate the resulting theory to previous approaches, highlighting a number of advantages it seems to offer.</p>
Gregor Damschen	<p>Modal Truthmaker Paradox Against Jago's Truthmaker Maximalism</p> <p>In this paper, I present the "Modal Truthmaker Paradox" (MTP), that avoids two weaknesses of Brendel's (2020) Truthmaker Paradox: the MTP does not rest on Montague's theorem and it does not assume that provability implies having a truthmaker. Moreover, MTP gives rise to a new problem for truthmaker maximalists (e.g. Jago 2020) as it assumes a weak variant of Truthmaker Maximalism (<If p is true, it is possible that p has a truthmaker>). If a truthmaker maximalist would like to block the MTP, s/he has to give up this weak form of truthmaker maximalism, even Jago's fixed Fitch (Jago 2021).</p>
Alexander Roberts	<p>The Metaphysics of Modalities</p> <p>Metaphysical necessity is an elusive notion. However one prominent thought is that it can be characterised in terms of its position with respect to other modalities. According to this characterisation, metaphysical necessity is the maximal <i>objective</i>, or <i>real</i>, species of necessity. This thesis is, and ought to be, central to our conception of metaphysical necessity. Nevertheless, I shall present an argument for the claim that a natural version of this thesis is incompatible with popular assumptions about metaphysical necessity.</p>

Session Title: Mereology

Name	Title and Abstract
Aviv Hoffmann	<p>Defining Perdurantism: An Enduring Problem</p> <p>Perdurantism is often defined in the literature as the view that objects persist by having instantaneous temporal parts at every moment at which they exist. I argue that, taken together, this definition and the standard definition of instantaneous temporal parthood fail to capture the view that perdurantists seem to have in mind. This is so because a condition involving whole presence is missing from these formulations. I amend the prevalent definition of perdurance and then offer an equivalent but simpler definition that does not involve instantaneous temporal parthood. The latter definition might contribute to the literature on the endurance/perdurantism dispute.</p>
Hwan Ho and Hsuan-Chih Lin	<p>Mereological Nominalism: A Locative Turn</p> <p>Mereological nominalism is a theory of properties infamous for its absurd consequences: the property had by one thing is also had by its parts, and two co-extensional properties would be identical. In this paper, we argue that a revision from locationism is able to deal with these problems in a <i>mereological way</i>, <i>pace</i> Effingham (2020), who offers a non-mereological revision. Moreover, this account not only avoids the absurd consequences but provides an account of how relations work: a yet unsolved problem for other mereological nominalists.</p>

Jonathan D. Payton	<p>Events and Mereological Essentialism</p> <p>Events are sometimes thought to have their parts essentially. David-Hillel Ruben (2018) argues that this is false, by running a <i>reductio</i> from the assumption of mereological essentialism. I show that a parallel <i>reductio</i> can be run, even without the assumption of mereological essentialism, and that Ruben has no attractive way to block this <i>reductio</i> without undermining his original argument. I sketch a response to both arguments which is consistent with the view that events have their parts necessarily.</p>
Riccardo Baratella, Giancarlo Guizzardi	<p>Towards an Understanding of Processes as Variable Embodiments</p> <p>In a series of papers, Fine develops the theory of variable embodiments. This theory, it is claimed, provides an adequate model of objects. A variable embodiment ff is a <i>sui generis</i> whole constructed from a principle f, the principle of a variable embodiment. The goal of this article is to clarify the nature of such a principle. Specifically, we argue against the view that it should be understood extensionally as either a partial function or total function.</p>

Session Title: Social Ontology

Name	Title and Abstract
Mirko Prokop	<p>Environmental Understanding</p> <p>Drawing on Michael Thompson's idea of a life-form, this paper discusses the understanding and significance of the environment in relation to the possibility of gaining a priori understanding of a life-form. I will argue that meditation on Thompson's account may explain how such a priori understanding is possible through evaluative judgements relating to an organism's environment. If accurate, my analysis brings out neglected aspects of Thompson's framework, and highlights the significance of the environment for the understanding of life-forms, including our own.</p>
Dan López de Sa	<p>The Construction of the Sexes</p> <p>This paper aims to contribute two different ways in which <i>the sexes</i> may turn out to be, although somehow related to biological features of organisms like us, socially constructed. After presenting a working characterization of <i>social</i> kinds in terms of constraints and enablements, I contrast the Conferral-Tracking with the more radical Scaffolding Models. I briefly illustrate which kind of considerations seem available for the social construction of the sexes according to both of these models. I finally consider a worry arising from so-called cluster property accounts of natural kinds.</p>
Christine Lopes	<p>Gender or Genus</p> <p>I present and discuss an integrative and a non-reductionist approach to the question of whether biology constrains freedom of gender. I understand by freedom of gender a freedom to conform or not to a gender. The integrative approach aims to integrate biological and practical dimensions of human life by referring to an ethical attribute—the attribute of having a grievable life—that could overcome the violence and inequalities associated with categorial distinctions among human beings. The non-reductionist approach proposes that biological categories do not exhaustively describe or explain gender phenomena <i>vis a vis</i> their social, cultural, political and legal aspect.</p>
Jane Loo	<p>Is humanity <i>Homo sapiens</i>?</p> <p><i>Homo sapiens</i> and humanity are coextensive, but we also make statements such as 'humanity can survive the extinction of <i>Homo sapiens</i>'. We cannot consistently hold that <i>Homo sapiens</i> and humanity are identical and think that humanity can survive the extinction of <i>Homo sapiens</i>. I argue that humanity is not just <i>Homo sapiens</i>, even though <i>Homo sapiens</i> and humanity are coextensive. In doing so, this sheds light on the relationship between <i>Homo sapiens</i> and humanity, which has implications for work in existential risk and related fields, and demonstrates how metaphysics can inform the practical.</p>

Session Title: Agreement and Disagreement

Name	Title and Abstract
Annina Julia Loets	<p>Two Puzzles for Epistemicism about Communicative Consent</p> <p><i>Epistemicism about communicative consent</i> is the view that the role of communicative consent is purely epistemic. For a person to consent to a particular course of action just is for them to <i>be</i> in agreement with it. The role of expressing such agreement is merely to make one's agreement <i>known</i> to the other. Failing to secure communicative consent is wrong not because sex is always non-consensual under such conditions, but because others are subjected to an undue <i>risk</i> of non-consensual sex. This article raises two challenges for such epistemicist views: first, they struggle to explain why knowing that another is in agreement with some interaction is not always sufficient for acting on that basis. Secondly, they struggle to explain why expressed agreement or disagreement does not provide merely defeasible evidence.</p>
Guido Melchior	<p>The Rational Irresolvability of Deep Disagreement</p> <p>The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will provide a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Such a theory is interesting in its own right, since it conflicts with the view that rational attitudes and procedures are paradigmatic tools for resolving disagreement. Moreover, I will suggest replacing discussions about deep disagreement with an analysis of rationally irresolvable disagreement, since this notion can be more clearly defined and captures the basic intuitions underlying deep disagreement.</p>
Allan Hazlett	<p>Testimonial Understanding</p> <p>I argue that understanding can be transmitted by testimony, i.e. that testimonial understanding is possible. Appreciating the possibility of testimonial understanding requires rejecting the idea that testimonial exchanges are characterized by one person telling another person that <i>p</i>. In addition, I argue, some testimonial exchanges involve one person explaining to another why <i>p</i>. This defense of testimonial understanding is consistent with the view that understanding is not a species of propositional knowledge.</p>
Christiana Werner	<p>Testimony, Imagination, and Knowing What It Is Like to Have a Complex Experience</p> <p>In recent debates, for example on decisions, a majority assumes that we cannot, via testimony, acquire knowledge of what it is like ('WIL-knowledge') to have what I call complex experiences such as "being a parent" (Paul 2014). This paper aims to challenge this sceptical consensus: firstly, subjects without the complex experience can have WIL-knowledge of its components. Secondly, testimony can be used as instruction manual for imagination. This enables WIL-knowledge transfer: a subject can put together imaginatively the components of the experience according to the testimony.</p>

Session Title: Pragmatics and Meaning

Name	Title and Abstract
Sandy Berkovski	<p>Derogation and the maxim of quantity</p> <p>According to nearly all theorists writing on the subject, a certain derogatory content is regularly and systematically communicated by slurs. So united, the theorists disagree sharply on the elements of this content, on its provenance, and on its mechanism. I argue that the basic premiss of all these views, that there is any such derogatory content conveyed with the use of slurs, is highly dubious.</p>
Alper Yavuz	<p>Metaphor and Interaction</p> <p>Interactionist theory of metaphor argues that metaphorical meaning arises from the interaction of two thoughts; one thought <i>frames</i> or <i>organises</i> the other, and the matching features in this framing process constitute the metaphorical meaning of the metaphorically used expression. For example in "Juliet is the sun" the sun-thought frames the Juliet-thought, and the metaphorical meaning of "the sun" is determined. In this paper, I will first present Elisabeth Camp's interactionist theory of metaphor and then raise some objections to it. In the end, I will briefly explore how an alternative theory of metaphor could look like.</p>

Alex Radulescu	<p>Answering the Humpty Dumpty Objection</p> <p>If Humpty Dumpty is mistaken in claiming that he is the master of his words, is intentionalism false? A common intentionalist response is to say that although intentions are all-powerful, one cannot intend to mean what one believes to be incommunicable. In this paper, I have two aims. First, I show that this response is weaker than it looks: communication is not speakers' only goal; that limit on intentions applies only to rational agents; and mere intentional action is less constrained than having intentions. Second, I offer updated responses that still work, even in the modified, weaker form.</p>
John Horden	<p>A Puzzle about "Is One of"</p> <p>It might be thought that some terms are pseudo-singular: syntactically singular but semantically plural; which is to say that despite their misleadingly singular surface form, they can denote two or more things together. Importantly, this idea promises to explain the coherence of many tempting many-one identity claims; for instance, any pair of logicians is identical to two logicians. Indeed, it might be thought that all group terms are pseudo-singular. Here I present and try to solve a novel puzzle about the expression "is one of", which challenges the coherence of pseudo-singularity and the plural view of groups.</p>

Session Title: Reference and Index

Name	Title and Abstract
Michael Ernest Markunas	<p>Our Knowledge of the Natural Numbers</p> <p>This paper concerns our knowledge of the natural numbers. The discussion of this knowledge will proceed by examining a puzzle about referring to the natural numbers. Briefly stated, the puzzle is that some numerical expressions, most notably the numerals, seem to be privileged referential devices. But the explanation of why and how they are privileged has so far remained elusive. Several writers have attempted to explain this fact, and while their accounts provide insight into the puzzle, they nevertheless fall short of a fully satisfactory account of our knowledge of the natural numbers. Drawing on this literature, I present my own solution to the puzzle. To foreshadow, my conclusion is that certain expressions are privileged because they reflect our knowledge by acquaintance.</p>
Gabe Dupre	<p>Reference and Morphology</p> <p>Standard work in philosophy of language assumes that reference is typically enabled by communicative networks within which a "name is spread from link to link as if by a chain." (Kripke (1980) p.171). By inheriting a name in this way, we inherit its associated referential powers. I argue, drawing on contemporary work in theoretical morphology, against the assumption that such chains consist in the transmission of particular words. On this picture, reference-supporting chains can consist of many (phonologically and semantically) distinct words.</p>
Tadeusz Ciecierski	<p>In two weeks, I will be here</p> <p>The paper discussed the answering machine puzzle and offers a solution that is conservative with respect to the Kaplanian account of indexicality. The essay starts with the observation that some proper indexicals have demonstrative uses, it is argued that treating some occurrences of 'now' as cases of such uses results in an intuitive and simple solution to the puzzle.</p>
Ted Parent	<p>A cautionary note about self-reference</p> <p>If a semantically open language has no constraints on self-reference, one can prove an absurdity. The argument exploits a self-referential function symbol where the expressed function ends up being intensional in virtue of the self-reference. The prohibition on intensional functions thus entails that self-reference cannot be unconstrained, even in a language that is free of semantic terms. However, since intensional functions are already excluded in classical logic, there are no drastic revisionary implications here. Still, logicians do not seem aware of the potential danger, and so a word of warning is in order.</p>

Session Title: Philosophy of Mind

Name	Title and Abstract
Todd Moody	<p>Speaking Freely</p> <p>Linguist Mark Baker has argued that what Chomsky has referred to as the “creative aspect of language use,” or CALU, is evidence for “nonbiological nativism,” a dualistic conception of mind. This essay explains and extends his argument, considering the Turing Test as, at its core, a test for CALU. The case is made that passing the Turing Test remains elusive for the same reason that a scientific account of CALU remains elusive. Even the partial Turing Test successes that have been achieved do not really involve the creation of novel sentences from something that isn’t already sentential.</p>
Jonny Lee	<p>What is cognitive about ‘plant cognition’?</p> <p>This paper concerns minimal cognition—putative forms of cognition found primarily in organisms outside the animal kingdom—with a focus on plants. I examine the ‘cognitivist challenge’ which states that plants are not truly cognitive because they lack the ‘mark of the cognitive’. I offer several reasons to think the challenge fails. This response is then used to propose a ‘multidimensional mechanistic framework’ which recommends we sidestep dichotomous questions about whether plants are cognitive and conduct a more nuanced and empirically tractable investigation into the many ways they resemble paradigmatic cases of cognition at multiple organisational levels.</p>
Menno Lievers	<p>Disjunctivism about inner experience</p> <p>Disjunctivism is a well-established position about outer sense experience. In this paper I discuss whether disjunctivism is also a viable theory about the deliverances of inner sense. If we accept the description of certain empirical phenomena as instances of hallucinations, we first need to examine which theories of inner sense experience can accommodate hallucinations of inner sense. Alternatively, we have to challenge that inner sense hallucinations are possible, f.i. on the basis of Wittgenstein’s private language arguments. I defend disjunctivism about inner sense with an appeal to Martin’s ‘limits to self-awareness’, however, based on a different motivation.</p>
Zoe Drayson and Danielle Williams	<p>Instrumentalism and Marr’s computational level: lessons for Bayesian cognitive science</p> <p>In contemporary cognitive science, there is a disagreement over whether Bayesian models of the mind should be given a realist or an instrumentalist interpretation. Proponents of the instrumentalist view often appeal to David Marr’s levels of computational analysis to support their case. In this paper, we argue that the widespread tendency to associate Marr’s computational level with instrumentalism is a mistake: Marr’s levels are orthogonal to the debate between instrumentalism and realism.</p>

Session Title: Citizenship

Name	Title and Abstract
Rory Aird	<p>IN DEFENCE OF TRANSPARENCY</p> <p>C. Thi Nguyen has recently argued that transparency is tantamount to surveillance, and that this leads to bad consequences. In this paper, I defend transparency, and argue that blaming it for the worries highlighted by Nguyen is a misstep. I begin by outlining Nguyen’s view and his arguments for the pernicious effects of transparency, focusing on his <i>epistemic intrusiveness argument</i> and the <i>Charity Navigator</i> and <i>Sex Trafficking</i> case studies. Next, I offer my defence of transparency, arguing that the issues flagged by Nguyen are caused by bad metrics, not transparency. In the third section, I consider and reject a response from Nguyen relating to simple (bad) metrics being the only ones the non-expert public can understand. Finally, I propose that Nguyen has a dilemma: either his arguments lack a significant upshot, or he is making an unsupported substantive normative claim about transparency.</p>
Alexander Bryan	<p>The Epistemic Dimensions of Civil Disobedience</p> <p>Most accounts of civil disobedience claim to be content-neutral, assessing the permissibility of disobedience based on the convictions of the dissenters rather than the truth of their claims. I argue that there are epistemic conditions to permissible civil disobedience which complicate this picture. Agents have an obligation to their fellow citizens to take reasonable steps to ensure that the claims in support of which they intend to launch civil disobedience are not mistaken, due to the burdens such action places on others and the agreed importance of conscientiousness in such action.</p>

Andrei Bespalov	<p>Respect, Responsiveness, and the Fallibilism of Public Reason</p> <p>Mainstream political liberals hold that, in order to respect one another's freedom and equality, citizens should make political decisions only on the grounds of reasons that all may reasonably be expected to accept. Their opponents argue that justificatory restraint entailed by this public justification principle (PJP) is unnecessary for civic respect — it is enough that citizens open their reasons to critical scrutiny and be responsive to one another's arguments. I defend the importance of justificatory restraint and reformulate PJP in fallibilistic terms: Citizens should make political decisions only on the grounds of reasons that can be subject to reasonable criticism.</p>
Daniel Sharp	<p>What's Wrong with Denaturalization</p> <p>This paper offers a novel explanation of what's wrong with denaturalization powers. The account has two parts. First, citizenship's value consists in part in the robustness with which one possesses one's citizenship rights, and denaturalization undermines the security of these rights. Second, citizenship's value is partly a function of its <i>expressive meaning</i>: bestowing citizenship on a person expresses that person's basic socially equality. Since citizenship's meaning is partly a function of the rules governing its revocation, denaturalization alters citizenship's meaning in ways that undermine its egalitarian potential. I conclude by explaining how this argument helps rebut standard defenses of denaturalization.</p>

Session Title: Representation II

Name	Title and Abstract
Amir Horowitz	<p>Selective scientific realism and intentional irrealism</p> <p>It appears obvious that, though limited in force, intentional explanations and predictions enjoy remarkable systematic success. This success, it is argued, can only (or best) be explained by the assumption that behavior is caused by the ascribed intentional mental states. So (most plausibly), this assumption is true, and <i>a fortiori</i>, we have mental states with intentional contents. The aim of this paper is to refute this argument. I grant the argument's premise that folk psychology enjoys systematic success, and argue that this success can be well explained without postulating intentional contents. Rather, logico-syntactic properties carry this explanatory burden.</p>
Piotr Szalek	<p>The Early Modern Representationalism and the Kantian Pragmatism</p> <p>Following the two famous Sellarsian categories of the manifest and scientific images of the world and human beings, we can describe that the manifest image is a refinement of the ordinary way of conceiving things, and the scientific image is a theoretical picture of the world provided by science (see 1962/1963). The paper tries to show early modern origins of non-reductive metaphilosophy of mind arguing that the early modern philosophy was an effect of the attempt to synthesize the manifest and scientific images by creating one unified synoptic vision of the world, and was a part of an endeavour to build a new conceptual framework within which these two images could be combined.</p>
Ethan Landes	<p>Conceptual Engineering, Semantic Externalism, and Experimental Philosophy</p> <p>In this talk, I explore the interaction between conceptual engineering, semantic externalism, and experimental philosophy. I argue that any semantic externalist conceptual engineer interested in accurately determining the semantic properties of a word should employ empirical methods instead of armchair methods. Understanding why requires examining the difference between the epistemology of metasemantics and the epistemology of semantics. While metasemantics properly employs thought experiments, <i>semantic</i> properties, according to the semantic externalist, are grounded by contingent historical and social facts external to the speaker. These, I argue, are in the remit of lexicography and experimental linguistics, not the armchair.</p>
James Brown	<p>Mixed Disjunctions for Expressivists</p> <p>Expressivists face the embedding problem: the problem of explaining the meaning of embedded sentences given an expressivist account of those sentences in unembedded contexts. Most recently, it is argued that leading expressivist solutions to the embedding problem fail to explain mixed disjunctions, in which one sentence is an ordinary factual sentence and the other is a target sentence of the expressivist theory in question. I argue that mixed disjunctions can be explained by appealing to holism about mental content, which is independently motivated given standard functionalist assumptions about the mind already accepted by most expressivists.</p>

Session Title: Mind Association Fellows and Students

Name	Title
Federico Bongiorno (Studentship Holder)	How Can Delusions be Beliefs?
Nicholas Shackel (Fellowship Holder)	Bertrand's Paradox and the Principle of Indifference